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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
CONTINENTAL BANK & TRUST C'O.,
Plaintiff and Respondent

v.

Civil No. 9138

CHARLES CUNNINGHAM and
WINFORD BUNCE
1

Defendants and Appellants

APPELLANTS' BRIE·F

The above named appellants, defendants in the District Court, appeal from the judgment entered in this
cause by that court pursuant to respondent's Motion for
Summary Judgment.
STATEMENT OF ·FACTS

Plaintiff-respondent commenced an action in the District Court to obtain a judgment against the defendantsappellants on a Promissory Note executed by the defendants in favor of the plaintiff.
Defendants, by their answer, admitted the execution
of the Note and a mortgage to secure payment of same,
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liability for the unpaid balance of said note and as an affirmative defense alleged that a tender of full payment
had been made on January 31, 1958 to the plaintiff and
denied plaintiff's right to recover for attorney's fees,
court costs and interest incurred after January 31, 1958.
Defendants filed a counterclaim against plaintiff alleging the execution and d~livery of the Note and Mortgage to the plaintiff, tender after maturity to the plaintiff of the full unpaid balance of said note, plaintiff's refusal
to accept said tender and release the mortgage, that said
refusal was because of a conspiracy with one Hal Hancock to deprive defendants of their equity in the mortgaged premises, and that said refusal to accept payment
and release the mortgage prevented the defendants from
redeeming the mortgaged property from a sheriff's sale on
a first mortgage foreclosure and caused the defendants to
be damaged by the loss of their equity in the mortgaged
property.
Plaintiff's reply admitted the execution of an assignment of said note and mortgage to the said Hal Hancock
and denied that said assignment was part of a conspiracy
to enable Hancock to deprive the defendants of their
equity in the mortgaged premises and denies that a tender
of the amount due was made by the defendants to the
plaintiff on January 31, 1958.
Depositions of R. M. Worsley, agent for plaintiff corporation, and defendants were taken. Requests for Admission and Answers thereto and the Affidavit of R. M.
Worsley were filed and constitute part of the Record on
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Appeal. A Motion for Summary Judgment was filed by
plaintiff on August 6, 1959 and a Hearing on said Motion
was held in the District Court on August 19, 1959. Counsel argued the Motion however there was no testimony or
evidence introduced. After hearing the arguments of
counsel and defense having stated that the counterclaim
contained the facts which constituted defendants' claim
the Court granted plaintiff's motion and dismissed defendants' counterclaim. From that judgment of dismissal the
defendants have brought this appeal.
STATEMENT O·F POINTS
POINT I
THAT THE RECORD BE.FORE THE COURT
SHOWS A MATERIAL ISSUE BETWEEN THE
APPELLANTS AND RESPONDENT AND THAT
THE ALLEGATIONS OF APPELLANTS COUNTER CLAIM, IF PROVED, WOULD ENTITLE
APPELLANTS TO RECOVER FOR DAMAGES.
POIN'T II
THAT WHERE THERE IS ANY GENUINE
ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT, A MOTION FO·R SUMMARY JUDGMEN·T SHOULD BE
DENIED.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THAT THE RECORD BEFORE THE COURT
SHOWS A MATERIAL ISSUE BETWEE.N THE
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APPELLANTS AND RESPONDENT. AND THAT
THE ALLEGATIONS OF APPELLANTS C·OUNTE·R CLAIM, IF P'ROVED, WOULD ENTITLE
APPELLANTS TO RECOVER F'OR DAMAGES~
The record shows: (a) That on January 31, 1958
plaintiff was the owner and holder of the promissory note
and mortgage of defendants. (Defendant's Counterclaimparagraphs 5, 14,: 15, 18. and 19; plaintiff's Amended
Complaint - paragraphs 1 and 2 and copy of Note at:-:
tached; Deposition of· Robert M. Worsley-page 4, line 9;
page 15, lines 13 through 30 and page 16, lines 1 through
12, lines 18 through 30; page 27, line 23 through page 28
and to page 29, line 5, page 30, line 13 through 25). Plaintiff denies that it was the owner and holder of the promissory note and mortgage on January 31, 1958. (See Affidavit of R. M. Worsley.)
(b) That the defendants offered and attempted to
pay said note and obtain a release of the mortgage on January 31, 1958. (See Defendants Counterclaim, paragraph
18; Deposition of Robert. M. Worsley-page 19, line 13
through 17; page 29, line 13 throug:Q. 15; page 21, line 24
through 30.) Plaintiff denies defendants' tender. (See
Plaintiff's Reply, paragraph 18.)
(c) That plaintiff refused to allow defendants to pay
the note and obtain a release of said mortgage. (Defendants' Counterclaim, paragraph 19; Deposition of Robert M.
Worsley, page 16, line 18 through·30.)
(d) That plaintiff knew: defendants would lose a
substantial sum of money if they (defendants) were not
allowed to redeem the property from the foreclosure sale
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and that payment to plaintiff was prerequisite to the right
to redeem from the foreclosure sale. (Defendants' Counterclaim, paragraphs 17 and 18; Deposition of Robert M.
Worsley, page 21, line 34 throrugh 30.) This is denied by
plaintiff. (See Plaintiff's Reply, paragraph 18.)
(e) That the refusal of plaintiff to allow defendants to pay the note and obtain a release of said mortgage
caused dalmages to the defendants. (Defendants' Counterclaim, paragraph 20; Deposition of Winford Bunce, page
43, line 11 through 23.)
From the foregoing it is apparent that the Record
shows a material issue to exist between plaintiff and defendants.
That defendants would be entitled to recover for damages if the allegations of the Counterclaim were proved
the Court's attention is directed to Title 57-3-8 U.C.A.
1953 which read as follows:
"If the mortgagee fails to discharge or release any mortgage after the same has been fully
satisfied, he shall be liable to the mortgagor for
double the damages resulting from such failure.
Or the mortgagor may bring an action against the
mortgagee to compel the discharge or release of
the mortgage after the same has been satisfied; and
the judgment of the court must be that the mortgagee discharge or release the mortgage and pay
the mortgagor the costs of suit, and all damages
resulting from such failure."
In Swaner v. Union Mortgage Co., a Utah case, 105
P2d342, the Court stated:
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"The holder of a mortgage renders hi_mself
liable to statutory penalty for refusing to release
mortgage upon sufficient tender, although holder
claims that tender is insufficient.''
Also see Nalder v. Kellogg, 4 U2d 117, 288 P2d 456;
Shibata v. Bear River State Bank (Utah case) 205 P2d
251.
Corpus Juris Secundum on Mortgages, commencing
at page 745 states:
''Damages are recoverable for a wrongful refusal to release or satisfy a mortgage after payment; and in many jurisdictions a remedy is provided by statutory provision which, being generally regarded as penal, are strictly construed.
"While it has been said that there is no right
of action at common law for damages for failure
to satisfy a mortgage, independently of statute a
right of action exists for damages for refusal, after
payment, to reconvey property deeded as security
or to release or discharge a mortgage. * * *
Page 746: A right of action exists when the
debt secured has been paid in full or tendered or
all other legal conditions have been fulfilled, and
plaintiff is entitled to the release or satisfaction
demanded and refused.
"In order to 1nake out a right of action, it is
necessary to show that plaintiff is entitled to the
release or satisfaction demanded and that the debt
secured by the mortgage has been paid in full, or
that the whole amount justly due has been tendered, including any fees and costs accrued and
the statu tory allowance, * * *
Page 749: The complaint or petition should
state all the facts necessary to establish plaintiff's
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right to recovery. It should show plaintiff's title to
maintain the action, and should describe the mortgage and show the relation of the parties to be
that of mortgagor and mortgagee, and should aver
distinctly the payment of the debt secured or other
full performance of the conditions of the mortgage,
and the demand for entry of satisfaction and refusal thereof, and that the expenses of filing and
recording such release were paid or tendered to
the holder of the mortgage. * * *
Defendants alleged in their counterclaim that plaintiff, on January 8, 1958, entered into a fraudulent and
corrupt conspiracy and agreement with one Hal Hancock
and executed a purported assignment of said promissory
note and mortgage (par. 14); that no delivery of the note
was made and that there was no consideration to support
said assignment (par. 15) and that said purported assignment was made to enable the said Hancock to attempt to
redeem the mortgaged property in his (Hancock's.) name
and deprive the defendants of their equity in said property
(par. 16).
The Affidavit of Robert M. Worsley, filed by the
plaintiff states:
AFFIDAVIT
"Robert M. Worsley being first duly sworn
deposes and says:
1. That he is an employee of the Continental
Bank & Trust Company, plaintiff herein, and is
personally familiar with the transactions which are
the subject of this action.
2. That on February 3, 1956, defendants executed and delivered to plaintiff a promissory note,
a copy of which is attached to plaintiff's complaint.
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3. That on June 10, 1957, defendants executed .a mortgage to secure said promissory note,
which note was then in default, and said mortgage
was delivered to affiant.
4. T·hat on April 30, · 1957, First Security
Bank commenced an action to foreclose the mortgage on the same property, which mortgage was
prior to the mortgage of Continental, and on July
8, 1957, property securing said mortgage was sold
at foreclosure sale by the sheriff of Grand County,
and was purchased by Flrst Security Bank, subject
to the right to redeem witJ;lin six months from
that date.
5. That on January 8, 1958, the last day for
redemption of the property as provided by law,
C'ontinental was approached by one Hal Hancock
and did assign its interest in the promissory note
and mortgage which it held on said property under
the terms and conditions reflected in the assign-.
ment and letter executed by Hancock and Continental, copies of which are attached to this affidavit
and incorporated herein by reference.
·6. That on January 31, 1958, the assignment
to Hancock was still in effect.
7. That said mortgage and promissory note
were not reassigned to Continental by Hancock
until about September 2, 1958.
Dated this 6th day of August, 195·9.
S/ROBERT M. WORSLEY
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 6th
day of August, 1959.
S/RUTH ATKINSON
Notary Public
Residing at Salt Lake- City, Utah
My commission expires: 9-1-59"
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A copy of the Assignment is attached D! the Affidavit
and is here set forth in full:
"ASSIGNMENT OF REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS,
That the Continental Bank and Trust Company, a
Utah state banking corporation with its principal
place of business at Salt Lake City, Utah, the party
of the first part, for and in consideration of the
sum of Twenty One Hundred Thirty Three and
47/lOO******Dollars ($2133.47) to it in hand paid
by Hal Hancock the party of the second part, the
receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, does by
these presents, grant, bargain, sell, assign, transfer and set over unto the said party of the second
part, a certain mortgage, bearing date of June lOth
1957, made and executed by Charles Cunningham
& Wilford Bunce, Mortgagors, to the party of the
first part, mortgagee, and recorded on June lOth
1957, in Book 7-K of Mortgages, at page 42-43, in
the office of the county recorder of the County of
Grand, State of Utah.
TOGETHE.R with the indebtedness and promissory note therein described, and the money due
and to become thereon, with interest as provided
in said note and mortgage.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the said party of
the first part has caused these presents to be executed by its officer thereunto lawfully authorized
and its corporate seal to be hereunto affixed this
8th day of January, 1958.
THE CONTINENTAL BANK AND TRUST
COMPANY
By S/ GLEN STEF'FENSON,
Assistant Vice President
(Acknowledgment)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

10
A copy of the Letter agreement referred to in the
Affidavit is attached to the Affidavit and is here set forth
in full:
The Continental Bank & Trust Company
P. 0. Box 1770
Salt Lake City, Utah
I propose to redeem the following described
property located at Moab, Grand County, Utah,
upon which the Continental Bank & Trust Company owns a second mortgage. To wit:
Beginning at Northwest corner Blk 25 runing thence South 131 feet; East 171 feet,
North 131 feet; West 171 feet to beginning.
I will execute to the Continental Bank & Trust
C;ompany a note which shall be due and payable
on or before the 20th day of January in the amount
of $2133.47. In return for said note, The Continental Bank will assign to me that certain mortgage
dated on June 10, 1957, wherein Charles Cunningham and Winford Bunce appear as mortgagors and
the c:ontinental Bank & Trust Company appears
as Mortgagee, which mortgage was recorded on
June 10, 1957, Entry No. 282514, Book 7-K, pages
42-43, in the office of the County Recorder, Grand
Oounty, Utah. With this assignment of the real
estate above referred to, I propose to redeem the
property above described from the sheriff's sale
held pursuant to the action brought by the First
Security Bank, and in the event I am unable to
redeem the property, then I will assign the real
estate mortgage above referred back to the Continntal Bank & Trust C'Ompany, and in exchange, it
is my understanding that the Bank will return the
promissory note executed on January 8, 1958 by
me in favor of the Continental Bank in the amount
of $2133.47.
(S) Hal Hancock"
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Appellants contend that respondent was the owner
and holder of the note and mortgage on January 31, 1958,
supported by the record as follows: (a) The retention at
all times of the promissory note by the respondent. Robert M. Worsley testified commencing on page 4, line 6
(Deposition of Robert M. Worsley) as follows:
Did you deliver this assignment and the
promissory note and mortgage to Mr. Hancock at
that time?
Q.

A. No. The mortgage was delivered to him
with a photostat of the note. We retained the original note. We had a side written guarantee. I don't
mean guarantee, but agreement covering that.
Q.

Explain that to us, will you?

A. Yes, the original note was available when
and if our other agreement was breached.
Q.

What other agreement was that?

A. Well, it is contained in the agreement basically that if they were able to redeem the property-"
Title 44-1-31 U.C.A. 1953 provides
"An instrument is negotiated when it is transferred from one person to another in such manner
as to constitute the transferee the holder thereof.
If payable to bearer, it is negotiated by delivery;
if payable to order, it is negotiated by the indorsement of the holder completed by delivery."
1.(he purported assignment of the Note and
mortgage was totally lacking in consideration and by the
terms of the side agreement (letter) executed by Hancock
and the respondent said assignment, even if valid, was
(bj)
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inffectual on January 31, 1958. The above referred to
Letter (side written guarantee) provides that the consideration for the assignment was a conditional promise to
pay $2133.47 which condition was that Hancock would
be able to redeem the property prior to January 20, 1958.
There was no redemption of the property prior to January
20, 1958, and hence no obligation to pay Continental and
therefor consideration to support the assignment was
totally lacking.
By the terms of the Letter agreement between respondent and Hancock, assuming for the purpose of argument that the Assignment and Letter agreement were
valid transactions, on January 31, 1958 Hancock didn't
owe the respondent any money because there had been
no redemption and was only obligated to return the unrcorded Assignment of Mortgage. Continental (respondent) held the original note and the only persons to whom
it could look for payment were the appellants.
POINT II
THAT WHERE THERE IS ANY GENUINE
ISSUE AS TO ANY MATERIAL FACT, A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE
DENIED.
In Young v. Felorina, 121 U. 646, 244 P. 2d 862 the
court stated:
"If there is any genuine issue as to any material fact, the motion should be denied."
In United States v. General Instrument Corp. (1949,
DC NJ) 87 F Supp 157, the court stated:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
"that on motions for summary judgment, it is
not for the court to resolve disputed questions
which appear in issue but to determine whether a
question of fact is present; however, the facts being
determined, a court is not precluded from adjudicating the legal consequences to be drawn from
undisputed facts."
In Morlan v. Durland Trust Co. (1952) 127 Colo 5, 252
P2d 98 the court pointed out that:
"summary judgment is properly granted only
where the facts are clear and undisputed, and
quoted with approval. from a federal district court
decision (Michel v. Meier [1948, DC Pa] 8 FRD
464) that "in passing upon a· motion for ·summary
judgment, it is no part of the court's function to
decide issues of fact but solely to determine whether there is an issue of fact to be tried.''
Attention is directed to King v. Rubinsky (1951, Tex
Civ App) 241 SW2d 220, where the court stated:
"On hearing the motion for summary judgment the court's prerogative is to determine, if
possible, whether there is a genuine controversy
between the litigants. If it is clear there is none,
then it is his duty to grant the motion. If the mat, ter is reasonably doubtful the motion would ·be refused. The court should not decide the controverted
issues in the case. These should be submitted to
the court or jury upon trial of the case upon its
merits. If this was not the rule a party could
easily be deprived of his constitutional right to a
t.rial by jury. * * * We find no fault with the rule
and believe it is a just one for its intended purpose.
However, we feel that proceedings under it should
be had with a great deal of caution and in no event
should a summary judgment be granted unless
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it is made to appear with reasonable certainty
that there is no genuine issue in the case. Otherwise it would become the means of depriving a
litigant of valuable substantive rights."
Rule 56(c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that the judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
The record discloses various substantial controverted
issues between plaintiff and defendants and therefor the
lower courts dismissal of defendant's Counterclaim on
plaintiff's motion for Bummary judgment was error.
CONCLUSION
At the hearing on respondent's motion for summary
judgment no evidence or testimony was presented, however arguments of counsel were heard. As there is no
transcript nor findings of fact by the court it is difficult
for appellant's counsel to know the basis for the court's
dismissal of appellants' counterclaim. The Affidavit of
Robert M. Worsley is controverted by the allegations of
defendants' counterclaim, the Letter attached to and made
a part of said Affidavit, and Mr. Worsley's deposition as
pointed out above. The allegations of defendants' counterclaim were materially controverted by respondent's Reply,
Mr. Worsley's deposition and Mr. Worsley's Affidavit.
Did the appellants owe the respondent a sum of money
on January 31, 1958? Respondent says, No," and appellants say, "Yes."
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Was respondent's assignment on January 8, 1958
valid and still in effect on January 31, 1958 or was it fictitious and entered into for the purpose of enabling one
Hancock to redeem the mortgaged property in his own
name and deprive the appellants of their equity in said
property? Respondent states the Assignment was valid
and still effective on January 31, 1958. Appellants contend the record shows the assignment not effective or in
force on January 31, 1958, that it was executed without
any consideration, that its execution had no effect whatever on the owneTship of the Note and was executed for
the purpose of enabling Hancock to redeem the property
in his own name and deprive the appellants of their equity
in the property.
Appellants believe substantial issues are shown by
the record to exist and unless said issues can be presented to the court or jury appellants will be deprived of valuable substantive rights.
The trial court's judgment dismissing appellants'
counterclaim should be reversed and the case remanded
for trial.

Respectfully submitted.
HARRY E,. SNOW,
MAXWELL BENTLEY,
Attorneys for Appellants
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